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Liability for Botnet Attacks 
Jennifer A. Chandler†
because the ‘‘arms race’’ between hackers and theIntroduction 
security industry means that many of these solutions
require continuous updates. troubling change has taken place recently in mali-A cious attacks over the Internet. 1 The motives of It is likely that some or all of these problems are not
attackers have shifted from the pursuit of thrills and the being resolved in the most efficient manner possible.
acquisition of bragging rights to mercenary goals. The The weak points, particularly in the case of botnets, are
attacks and attackers have become more organized and the inadequately secured personal computers of average
professional. In particular, attackers have begun to users. These users do not face the full costs of their lack
develop ‘‘botnets’’ or networks of infected computers of computer security. This is particularly the case now
that they are able to control remotely. These botnets are that bot software is being designed to be minimally dis-
used to send spam, to circulate malware (such as viruses), ruptive to the computer owner, so that bots may avoid
to steal confidential information, to launch distributed detection and removal. Accordingly, average users fail to
denial of service (‘‘DDoS’’)  attacks, 2 and to extort protec- invest in security. They do not become educated about
tion money from Web sites by threatening such attacks, security, they do not ensure that flaws in their software
among other harmful uses. The key problem with are appropriately patched, nor do they demand secure
botnets is their ability to make use of large numbers of software from vendors in the first place. They either fail
computers at once. This makes profitable a broader to apply security measures such as anti-virus software or
range of attacks, including those that would otherwise firewalls or, if they do apply them, they do not maintain
not be worthwhile. 3 In addition, botnets can be sold or them conscientiously. In economic terms, they impose
rented out, and easily updated with new attack tools to significant negative externalities on cyberspace. Although
suit the needs of buyers in the underground botnet a user’s personal investments in security will offer him or
market. her protection against some threats (such as spyware), the
Vast quantities of resources are being devoted to user is otherwise dependent on the security investments
cyber security, fuelled by concern about our increasing of others to avoid spam and DDoS attacks.
reliance on Internet communications as well as the
This paper will consider the possibility of using tortdesire to ensure that the social and economic benefits of
liability to address cyber insecurity. In previous work, Ithe Internet are realized. However, despite investment,
have proposed a hypothetical lawsuit by the victim of athe cyber insecurity problem remains. The current
DDoS attack against the vendor of unreasonably inse-approach to cyber security is often reactive rather than
cure software, the flaws of which are exploited to createpreventative. Flawed software is remedied by the expen-
the DDoS attack army.7 Indeed, software vendors aresive patching process rather than by releasing robust
facing increasing public disapproval for their contribu-software in the first place. 4 Malware proliferates at a rate
tions to cyber insecurity. 8 However, not all DDoS attackthat makes it difficult to produce new patches and new
armies are assembled by exploiting flaws in software.virus signatures, and to deploy them at a sufficient pace
Computers are also infected when users voluntarily opento avoid infections. 5 Harmful communications such as
infected email attachments or download infected filesspam or denial of service attacks are met with filtration
from file-sharing networks. Accordingly, the cyber inse-systems that consume financial and computing
curity resulting from the large numbers of average end-resources, and slow legitimate traffic.
users with infected computers cannot be entirely
With the exception of personal firewalls, these solu- addressed by reducing the number of exploitable flaws
tions become available only after a vulnerability or attack in widely-deployed software. It may be useful to find
is identified, often after damage has already been caused. additional ways to address other avenues of infection.
Furthermore, these solutions are expensive and inconve-
nient given that they must be deployed on many com- Some have argued that we should focus on modi-
puters. 6 Deployment is not the end of the matter fying end-user behaviour or catching the criminals
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14 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
directly responsible for malware and cyber-attacks. As infection, and also as malicious HTML code that runs
discussed below, I suggest that effort of this sort is useful automatically when an email is viewed using certain
but insufficient. Another possibility is to induce ISPs to email client programs. 14 Bots can also infect users who
take a far more active role in (1) ensuring end-users’ view maliciously designed Web sites using vulnerable
computers are appropriately maintained in order to Internet browser software. 15 Many bots, such as the
reduce the risk of malware infection, and (2) monitoring Gaobot/Agobot, Mytob and Spybot families, use mul-
end-users’ computers so that infected computers can be tiple methods to propagate. 16
quarantined before they cause harm. An increase in ISP Although many of the current bots contain their
control over subscribers’ computers would have some own propagation mechanisms, not all bots do. Instead,
negative consequences, and it would be necessary to con- some simply connect to the botnet’s remote control
sider whether the anticipated increase in cyber security is channel to await instructions after they are installed on a
a sufficient benefit to outweigh the potential harms. computer. 17
Should it be decided that ISP liability is a useful
approach, the hypothetical lawsuit by the victim of a
DDoS attack that I described in earlier work could also Remote Control 
be brought against the ISP that hosted all or part of the Bots are distinguished from other forms of malwareattacking botnet. due to their ability to form coordinated networks, or
Part I of this paper will discuss the emerging ‘‘botnets’’, under the command of the botnet con-
problem of bots and botnets. Part II will explore what troller. 18 This is achieved in a variety of ways.
ISPs can do about botnets, and will briefly outline the
One common method is to design bots that, oncepossible argument in tort that could be made by the
installed on an infected computer, attempt to join spe-victim of a DDoS attack launched from an ISP’s network.
cific Internet Relay Chat (‘‘IRC’’) communication chan-
nels. IRC is a system that enables multiple member dis-
cussions in forums called IRC channels under thePart I — Overview of Bots and control of channel operators. 19 Once connected to the
Botnets designated IRC channel, the bots await further com-
mands from the controller. 20 A botnet controller cann the computer world, a bot (short for ‘‘robot’’) is a
efficiently control numerous bots in this way. 21I software program that performs an automated pro-
cess. While some bots are useful (such as those used by Botnets are vulnerable to disruption if they are
search engines to browse through Web sites collecting detected and their IRC channels are disabled. 22 Bot
information to include in the search engine database), designers have attempted to protect their botnets by
malicious bots have also emerged and are a serious planting the IRC servers they use on compromised com-
threat to cyber security. The key components of a mali- puters, 23 by encrypting communications with the botnet,
cious bot (to which I refer simply as a ‘‘bot’’ in this paper) and by protecting access to the IRC channel by a pass-
are normally the following: a propagation mechanism, a word. 24 Another technique adopted by botnet control-
remote control function, and several actions that can be lers is to use a dynamic domain name service to identify
taken by the bot at the direction of the controller. 9 The the location of the IRC server. In this way, if a botnet’s
feature that distinguishes bots from other forms of mali- IRC channel is shut down, the controller can move to
cious code, or malware, is the use of a remote control another location. The bots are designed to join a channel
mechanism that permits them to be effectively on a server at a particular domain name that is registered
networked. These networks can be very large, consisting with the dynamic domain name service. If the IRC server
of tens of thousands of linked systems, 10 which together must move to a new IP address, the dynamic domain
offer considerable computing power. name service takes care of the redirection and the bots
can find the new IRC server even though they continue
to look for the same domain name.25Propagation 
A computer can become infected with a bot in In addition, bot designers are moving to new
numerous ways, and the creativity of malware writers methods of communication. Symantec has observed two
suggests that additional methods will arise. Bots can bots that use their own encrypted peer-to-peer net-
spread through network connections by exploiting vul- works. 26 The advantage of a peer-to-peer network model
nerabilities in software (normally the Windows oper- is that the detection and removal of one node will not
ating system), 11 by using backdoors installed on a com- disrupt the network, thus avoiding the vulnerability asso-
puter during an earlier malware infection, and by ciated with a centralized communication system like
cracking weak passwords on network shares. 12 They can IRC.27 An example of a bot that uses peer-to-peer com-
also spread through peer-to-peer file-sharing networks by munication is Phatbot. The bots register themselves as
adopting alluring filenames that induce other users to peers on the Gnutella network but use an atypical port
download them.13 They spread through email both as for communication, which serves to distinguish them


































































Liability for Botnet Attacks 15
Symantec also describes bots that use an email- remote retrieval of this information. 38 In addition to the
related protocol (POP3) to communicate. 29 The bots theft of confidential information, bots can be used for
connect to a predefined mail server to retrieve email general privacy invasion. For example, the Spybot family
messages that contain commands in email attachments. has been observed not only to log keystrokes and look
The bots can also respond to commands through the for stored passwords, but also to capture screenshots or
same channel. Symantec notes that ‘‘[s]ince POP3 com- webcam footage. 39
munication is not uncommon on most networks, this
traffic would be more likely to go undetected than a
Distributed denial of service attacks connection to an IRC server. Additionally, ports used for
Botnets are often used to launch DDoS attacks. Sta-POP3 communication are less likely to be filtered or
tistics on the level of DDoS activity vary, with Symantecblocked at the network perimeter’’. 30
reporting a steady increase in DDoS attacks in the last
half of 2004. 40 The number of DDoS attacks reported inThe Uses of Botnets 
the 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey,
Botnet controllers can deliver instructions to the on the other hand, showed a decline when compared to
bots through the IRC channel or other communication the 2003 data. In any event, DDoS attacks continued to
channel. If a bot is not already designed to perform a impose heavy costs, estimated at about $26 million in
particular function, the bots are easy to update by 2004 for the 269 respondents to the 2004 CSI/FBI
instructing them to download software from a specified survey. 41
location. 31 Among the activities performed by botnets
The motives for DDoS attacks are varied. One of theare sending spam (including phishing email), gathering
troubling uses that has emerged recently, and which isand returning sensitive data to the controller, launching
closely associated with botnets, is extortion. Starting inDDoS attacks, and speeding the spread of other malware,
about 2003, criminals began to threaten to disableamong other uses. 32
online betting companies with DDoS attacks during
peak gambling times unless the companies paidSpam and phishing thousands of dollars. 42 Other businesses that generate
Spam, or unsolicited bulk email, has become a tre- significant revenue online are equally vulnerable to
mendous online annoyance. 33 Estimates from early 2005 DDoS-related extortion. 43
of the proportion of email that is spam range from 68% Another example illustrates the use of botnets ‘‘forto 83%. Some of this email is more than merely hire’’. In 2004, Jay Echouafni and his co-conspiratorsannoying. A ‘‘phishing’’ attempt is an email message that were indicted in California after Echouafni paid a busi-attempts to trick the recipient into parting with confi- ness partner to arrange for hackers to launch DDoSdential information by masquerading as a message from attacks against his online business competitors. 44 Thea legitimate business such as a bank or eBay, and attacks, which took place in 2003, cost the victims overrequiring the victim to log in to confirm account details. $2 million and disrupted services for their ISPs and other
In an attempt to shut down spammers, multiple sites. 45 Echouafni, however, paid $1,000 for the attacks,
‘‘block lists’’ 34 are available to assist email servers to reject which were launched from the hackers’ botnets. 46 He
messages coming from IP addresses known to send claimed that his competitors had stolen some of his Web
spam. Spammers have reacted to this defensive strategy site content and were themselves launching DDoS
by relaying spam through compromised computers, attacks against his Web site. 47
including those linked into botnets. In this way, spam- DDoS attacks are occasionally used for political pur-mers are able to avoid being blocked by spam block lists. poses. Examples include attacks by Indian hackersSymantec reports that within its list of the top 50 against Pakistani government Web sites, 48 attacks oninstances of malware, the proportion that contains email- Web sites associated with the Chechen rebel move-relaying capacity has been steadily increasing from 37% ment, 49 and a spate of attacks originating in China andin the last six months of 2003, to 47% in the first six Korea against Japanese sites at a time of heightened ten-months of 2004, and 53% in the last six months of sion between the countries. 50 DDoS attacks have also2004. 35 been used, most likely by spammers, to attack spam
block-lists. 51
Spying and theft of confidential information 
Many of the common bots are designed to look for
Accelerating the propagation of malware confidential information in stored memory such as CD
keys for games, software product ID numbers, or pass- Botnets can also be used to ‘‘pre-seed’’ computers
words. 36 In addition, they may contain ‘‘packet sniffers’’ with malware in order to increase the speed of propaga-
and ‘‘keystroke loggers’’ to look for sensitive informa- tion and thus ensure an effective epidemic. It has been
tion. 37 The increase in the prevalence of malicious code suggested that the Witty worm was likely launched by a
designed to steal sensitive confidential information is botnet, as the worm broke out roughly at the same time


































































16 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
the world. 52 Symantec discovered that the Witty worm ‘‘for hire’’ offers a powerful incentive to criminals who
was launched from computers that did not run the vul- would not be motivated by the thrills or the pursuit of
nerable software that Witty exploited, further suggesting boasting rights that appear to have motivated hackers in
that it had been launched from a botnet. 53 Botnet the past.
owners have also profited from their botnets by
installing adware, for which they are paid by online
advertising companies on a ‘‘per install’’ basis. 54
Part II — Liability of ISPs for the
harms caused by botnets Other uses for botnets 
Botnets can be used for online advertising fraud. any parties contribute in some way to the botnet
Where an advertiser contracts with a Web site to carry M problem. The obvious culprits are the writers of
its advertisement and the fee varies according to the malware, the botnet controllers, and the parties who rent
number of visitors clicking on the ad, a botnet can be or pay for attacks by botnets. The criminal law exists to
used to click on the ads to inflate the traffic in order to deter and sanction this behaviour, but is clearly not suffi-
defraud the advertiser. 55 Botnets can be used to manipu- cient. The scale of the problem and the forensic and
late online polls, since each bot has a distinct IP address jurisdictional challenges of enforcement seem to have
and appears to be a unique vote. 56 They are also used to greatly reduced the deterrent impact of the criminal
manipulate certain online games. 57 law.69 These difficulties should not prevent the state
from continuing to pursue cyber-criminals to the extent
possible given limited resources, but it cannot be the soleThe Future of Botnets 
approach. It is also necessary to ensure that others whoAs the foregoing illustrates, botnets already present a
are well-positioned to detect and prevent attacks takeconsiderable danger. Unfortunately, this danger is
reasonable steps to do so. 70increasing. Reports of bot code increased steadily
The end-users who fail to maintain the security ofthrough 2004, and the number of documented variants
their systems supply the computers that form botnets. 71of the three major bots (Randex, Gaobot and Spybot)
Increasingly, however, even conscientious end-users canreached nearly 6,000 at the end of 2004. 58 McAfee
become infected. Systems are vulnerable due to the delayreports a three-fold increase in bot detection over the
between the discovery of a software flaw or a new piecefirst two quarters of 2005. 59
of malware and the implementation of a remedial patchThe future of botnets is quite worrisome. Botnets
or anti-virus update. The US CERT notes three occasionswill become increasingly effective as broadband access
in 2005 of major system infections resulting from newlyspreads. 60 Furthermore, mounting evidence suggests that
discovered worm variants not included in the then-cur-botnets are increasingly used for financial gain, that the
rent anti-virus signatures. 72 Firewalls cannot protectnewer bots are more sophisticated, and that their net-
against infections delivered via normal processes such asworks are increasingly difficult to disrupt. 61 Already
email or inadvertently browsing web sites infected withmany of the established bot families take steps to evade
malicious code. 73detection by terminating the processes of anti-virus
The apparent lack of interest in the security of theirsoftware on infected computers. 62 Some bots, such as
computers that is shown by average end-users is notPolybot, possess polymorphic ability, or the ability to
surprising. The average end-user does not have a good‘‘mutate’’ to impede detection by anti-virus software that
understanding of computer and network security. Evendepends upon specific virus signatures. 63 Polybot is mod-
those end-users who do have a reasonable understandingified each time it runs on an infected computer. 64
of security face the costs in time and money of installingThere is evidence that botnets are available for rent.
and maintaining security software, and patching softwareBotnets and zombies are reportedly available at prices of
flaws. Although programs such as Microsoft’s automatic5 to 10 cents per computer. 65 The market in botnets is
update system have eased the patching burden for thereasonably sophisticated, with dealers offering higher
average end-user, patches continue to cause problems.quality bots (i.e., high-bandwidth machines and
They are expensive to manage in the context of enter-machines located in jurisdictions where authorities are
prises, 74 and they periodically contain new flaws. 75perceived to be less likely to shut down bots66) at a
Another danger is that the patching system may bepremium, as well as making sales promotional offers. 67
hacked and users induced to download a compromisedThe ‘‘business’’ of malware was revealed in a public
patch. 76battle between rival gangs of malware writers in 2004.
The key problem, however, is that end-users do notWhen one group launched a worm designed to remove
suffer most of the costs associated with the insecurity ofa rival group’s worms from infected computers, the retal-
their computers. Furthermore, their investments iniatory worm contained insults and taunts along the fol-
security benefit others as much or more than they ben-lowing lines: ‘‘Hey, NetSky . . . don’t ruine our bussiness,
efit the end-users. In other words, end-users suffer verywanna start a war? [sic]’’ 68 The ability to generate money


































































Liability for Botnet Attacks 17
launch DDoS attacks, and any investment in securing targeting appears to be somewhat imprecise, affecting
their own computers will not protect them against the both infected computers that are relaying spam as well as
spam or DDoS attacks launched from the insecure com- other subscribers. 81 The threat of having to deal with
puters of others. This is increasingly the case as writers of subscribers upset by service interruption may cause ISPs
malware become interested in assembling botnets to use to take action to control bots on their networks.
for financial gain. Bot software is designed not to disrupt There appear to be a variety of measures that ISPsthe infected computer, but to quietly participate in the could take that would help to impede the propagation ofspam or attack activity directed by the botnet controller bot software (and thus suppress botnet creation) or toagainst another party. A noisy or disruptive bot would throttle botnet activity on their networks. ISPs could (1)risk detection and removal by the owner of the infected enforce the application of software patches and anti-viruscomputer. updates on subscriber computers, (2) scan subscribers’
To the extent that end-users do suffer from their computers for known infections, 82 (3) periodically scan
own computer insecurity, as is the case with the theft of subscribers’ computers to check the integrity of oper-
confidential information by spyware, most appear to be ating system, firewall and antivirus software, 83 (4) block
unaware of the threat, so it does little to encourage them email attachments with file extensions commonly associ-
to secure their systems. While this suggests that there is ated with infections or scan email attachments, (5) quar-
room for efforts to educate end-users, they will still not antine infected subscribers, 84 (6) block ports that are
face the costs of spam and DDoS, and this suggests that associated with known software vulnerabilities, 85 (7)
they will under-invest in security. Some have suggested block applications often used to transmit malware such
that end-users could be fined or sued in order to cause as peer-to-peer file-sharing, or (8) block all ports not
them to maintain system security. 77 This would, how- needed for a set of approved applications (e.g., e-mail,
ever, be expensive and would run into the difficulty that web browsing). Some of these measures may have signifi-
many infected computers may be located in other juris- cant negative consequences, and constitute an unaccept-
dictions. able exchange of freedom and privacy for cyber security
improvements.
There are also many measures that ISPs could takeResponsibility of Internet Service Prov-
to reduce some of the key harms inflicted by botnets. Iniders 
addition to some of the measures mentioned above, the
Canadian spam report lists a set of ISP best practices, 86
What can ISPs do? including blocking port 25 on subscribers’ computers, 87
monitoring the volume of subscribers’ email traffic, andISPs, including providers of home Internet access,
rate-limiting their email. Additional recommendationsuniversities and other network operators, are facing
are aimed at encouraging communication and coopera-increasing pressure to deal with the harms emanating
tion amongst network operators, as well as suppressingfrom bots on their networks. The Canadian government
address spoofing, and enhancing the traceability ofreleased the report of its task force on spam in May of
spam. 88 The U.S. FTC makes similar recommenda-2005. 78 The report recommends that ISPs and other net-
tions. 89work operators implement a set of best practices79 to
combat spam. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission With respect to DDoS attacks, ISPs can enforce
announced ‘‘Operation Spam Zombies’’ in May 2005, ‘‘egress filtering’’, which monitors IP packets sent from
which encourages ISPs to take steps to protect their sub- their subscribers to detect false source addresses (a char-
scribers’ computers from being used to relay spam. acteristic of some DDoS attacks). Other mechanisms
Should these exhortations be ignored, one suspects that based on monitoring for traffic anomalies have also been
regulation might follow. proposed to deal with DDoS.90 Most ISPs seem to choose
There are signs that the pressure on ISPs is starting not to invest in source-based preventative mechanisms
to come from private sector sources as well, including to forestall DDoS attacks on others. 91
the victims of DDoS attacks. A consortium of British
online gambling companies (which are often targeted by
What should ISPs do? DDoS extortion attempts) has started to lobby ISPs to
apply better security to combat DDoS attacks. 80 They are As noted above, there are many measures that ISPs
asking ISPs to distribute firewalls to customers to mon- could adopt that would reduce the spread of bot
itor for, and shut down the flood of attack traffic ema- software and the damage done by botnets. Some ISPs are
nating from, infected computers. Although they are cur- reportedly already blocking port 25, limiting the number
rently asking for help, it is possible that they might of emails that a subscriber can send through the ISP’s
eventually attempt a lawsuit. email server, and quarantining infected machines. 92
Some network operators are simply starting to Some ISPs already block email attachments with certain
block email received from ranges of IP addresses file extensions, 93 and others offer virus-scanning of
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The number of ISPs taking preventative measures for security purposes, they may more easily use this
and/or the type of measures adopted so far appear to be power for illegitimate purposes. Fourth, smaller ISPs will
insufficient to deal with botnets. Botnets are prolifer- not be able bear the costs of precautions as they do not
ating, even on the networks of ISPs that offer security have the economies of scale open to larger ISPs. 100 Fifth,
services to subscribers. Prolexic, a provider of anti-DDoS the increase in prices associated with additional security
filtering services, provides a summary of attack traffic measures will squeeze out marginal subscribers. 101 Sixth,
from the first two quarters of 2005, showing the top the pressure on others, such as end-users, to take reason-
twenty infected networks worldwide. 95 The list includes able steps to address cyber security will be reduced, and
numerous ISPs who provide free anti-virus software, per- the pursuit of innovative ways to assist end-users to pro-
sonal firewalls and other security protections. 96 tect themselves will be abandoned in favour of innova-
tion aimed at assisting ISPs to monitor and control theirStronger measures such as enforced system moni-
networks. 102 Seventh, imposing liability on domestic ISPstoring, patching and updating, and the application at
will not be effective in preventing the harms of botnets,source of anti-DDoS measures may be advisable, but
as they will merely relocate to other jurisdictions.such measures may raise costs and annoy subscribers. If
an ISP invests too much in security, to the benefit of These are valid concerns, and it is difficult to answer
everyone connected to the Internet, while competing many of them. In deciding whether or not it is wise to
ISPs do not, it may lose price-sensitive subscribers. 97 Sub- encourage or permit the courts to impose liability on
scriber reaction to intrusive safety measures would likely ISPs for botnets, it will be necessary to consider whether
depend upon the sophistication of the subscribers as the improvements in cyber security to be expected are
well as the measures taken. It is possible that ISPs will be worth tolerating the negative consequences.
unwilling to take the stronger measures, such as moni- There are dangers in shifting to an increasingly
toring for and suspending individual accounts, as they active role for ISPs in the control of information flowing
would have to deal with telephone calls from confused through their systems. ISPs may begin to censor or con-
and angry subscribers. 98 trol traffic for their own purposes. In a recent incident, a
ISPs will undoubtedly have some incentive to try to Canadian ISP blocked access by its subscribers to a Web
deal with botnets on their networks. These motivations site run by a labour union of its employees that was
include reducing complaints from the recipients of attempting to publicize its views about a labour dis-
harmful traffic (some of whom may be their own sub- pute. 103 Clark Ray notes the danger that ISPs might be
scribers), limiting the consumption of network resources tempted to collect information for resale to vendors or
by spam and DDoS sent by botnets, and avoiding the advertisers, to apply software updates unrelated to
possibility of having some traffic blocked by other ISPs. security, or to examine files unrelated to software main-
However, they will not face the full costs of botnets since tenance (e.g., searching for unlicensed software or unli-
many of the harms will be borne by others. As a result, censed music files). 104 Users might be able to protect
one might suspect that ISPs will take some measures, but their privacy to some extent by encrypting files. 105
may not take the optimal level of care to shut down There is also a danger that holding ISPs liable for
botnets. botnet attacks will cause them to limit excessively the
Two ways in which ISPs could be encouraged to nature of the service they offer, perhaps blocking all but
deal with botnets are regulation or liability for the harms a list of approved ports and applications. A more mod-
caused by botnets on their networks. I will not consider erate response would be to block only those ports
regulation further in this paper, except to note that ISPs known to be associated with problems. The example of
are strongly opposed to the idea of regulation, arguing the blocking of port 25 suggests that the market may
that rapid technological change and the need to permit respond to meet the needs of more sophisticated users
flexibility in implementing security measures militate who find themselves stymied by the port block. When
against codifying requirements by regulation. 99 The ISPs began to block port 25, new services emerged to
other possibility is liability in negligence to the victim of meet the requirements of users who wished to continue
a botnet attack emanating, in whole or in part, from an to run their own mail servers. 106 This type of circumven-
ISP’s network. Before discussing some of the arguments tion is likely not to be a problem because sophisticated
involved in such a lawsuit, I will turn now to the reasons users can be expected to maintain the security of their
why we might not wish to encourage ISPs to increase systems.
their control of subscriber activities. Another difficulty is that the infected computers
A number of arguments could be raised against may reside on the networks of foreign ISPs. In fact, if ISP
holding ISPs liable for botnet attacks. First, ISPs could liability is successful in reducing the ease with which
take measures that would unacceptably invade sub- botnets can be assembled, one would expect that botnets
scriber privacy. Second, ISPs could impose so many limi- would migrate to other jurisdictions. Parties seeking to
tations on subscriber activity that individual freedom pursue foreign ISPs would find it more challenging to
and innovation would be curtailed. Third, once ISPs are sue as a practical matter due to the issue of legal jurisdic-


































































Liability for Botnet Attacks 19
congenial jurisdictions is buttressed by the observation vehicles may be liable if they leave keys behind when it
that, in the underground zombie trade, the price of is reasonably foreseeable that the vehicles may be stolen
zombies hosted in certain countries is higher because and cause injury to others. 120 These cases reveal that a
they are considered less likely to be shut down.107 To the defendant may be liable to a plaintiff in negligence for
extent that foreign ISPs permit this to occur, they could creating an unreasonable risk of attack by an intervening
be black-listed and communications from them refused third party. As a result, there is precedent for an argu-
or limited. There are precedents for black-listing foreign ment that ISPs, by failing to prevent or disable botnets
servers that are significant sources of spam.108 on their networks, are creating a situation of risk of harm
to DDoS victims at the hands of the botnet controllers.
ISP Liability for Botnet Attacks The lawsuit by the victim of DDoS does face some
hurdles under current tort law. First, the defendant ISPThe suggestion that ISPs be held liable in negli-
might argue that it does not owe a duty of care to thegence if they fail to take reasonable steps to prevent
plaintiff. Second, the ISP might argue that the plaintiff’sattacks by botnets on their networks runs counter to the
losses are ‘‘pure economic losses’’, the recovery of whichwidespread tendency to treat ISPs as immune from lia-
is restricted in negligence cases. Finally, the ISP mightbility for the content of traffic on their networks. For
argue that the plaintiff is contributorily negligent forexample, the Canadian Human Rights Act, 109 the Cana-
failing to employ anti-DDOS services.dian Copyright Act 110 as discussed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Society of Composers, Authors and A plaintiff in a negligence case must establish thatMusic Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care. TheProviders, 111 and the recently tabled amendments to the Canadian legal test to determine the existence of a dutyCanadian Copyright Act112 provide some immunity to of care in a novel situation involves two steps. 121 First thenetwork operators who merely provide a transmission court must determine if there is a ‘‘relationship of prox-conduit for communications. In the United States, courts imity’’ between the plaintiff and the defendant, andhave interpreted very broadly the legislation immu- whether the harm to the plaintiff was a reasonably fore-nizing ISPs from liability, to the increasing consternation seeable consequence of the defendant’s acts. Second, theof several American commentators. 113 For example, court must consider if there are residual policy consider-Rustad and Koenig argue that ISP immunity should be ations that suggest that a duty of care should not bepared back in order to make ISPs ‘‘more accountable to recognized in the circumstances. The meaning of ‘‘prox-the public for excessive preventable dangers in cyber- imity’’ has caused great perplexity, but it appears to existspace’’. 114 The authors point out that ‘‘ISPs . . . are no where the relationship between plaintiff and defendantlonger delicate infants that need absolute immunity in is sufficiently ‘‘close and direct’’ that the defendant oughtorder to survive’’. 115 to foresee that its carelessness might harm the plaintiff
It is possible that this tendency to treat ISPs as and that it is just and fair that the defendant be required
immune from responsibility for activities on their net- to take care to avoid harming the plaintiff. 122
works might impede the legal argument advanced in
I have argued in an earlier paper that vendors ofthis paper. Nevertheless, I will now turn to the hypothet-
software that has achieved near complete market shareical lawsuit by the victim of a DDoS attack against the
are in a sufficient relationship of proximity with all usersdefendant ISP(s) that hosted the attacking botnet.
of cyberspace because their software in large measureThe victim of the DDoS attack is well-suited to be a
determines the structure and security of cyberspace forplaintiff in the proposed lawsuit. The DDoS victim
everyone. 123 ISPs do not have the same sort of necessarymight suffer the scale of loss that would motivate a law-
connection to the users of cyberspace as the vendor ofsuit. The DDoS ‘‘for hire’’ case described earlier inflicted
widely-deployed software, since the ISP market is moreover $2 million in losses on the three businesses
fragmented, and the available statistics suggest that theattacked. 116 The 2004 CSI/FBI survey reported that the
most infected network (aol.com) is responsible for about269 respondents estimated their losses from DDoS in
5% of bots in the world, and 11% of bots in the U.S. 1242004 at $26 million. 117 Groups of DDoS victims have
This suggests a lesser connection to everyone in cyber-already identified ISPs as capable of stemming the
space than a software vendor with near complete marketattacks. 118
share.
Tort law does permit liability to be imposed on a
defendant in situations in which the harm to the plain- It may be necessary to consider a form of ‘‘cyber-
tiff is caused most directly by a third party. The defen- proximity’’, or proximity that is tailored to cyberspace. It
dant may be held responsible where he or she creates a is clear that the Internet presents a seemingly intractable
situation of unreasonable risk such that a plaintiff will be challenge to law enforcement and security by virtue of
harmed by a third party. 119 For example, Canadian the unprecedented level of worldwide interconnection
courts have held landlords responsible where their inad- involvrd, and the volume of communication. We may
equate security measures expose tenants to attack by need to move to a more broadly distributed model of
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harms that his or her corner of the network may cause to loss of a competitor. 131 In addition, pure economic losses
everyone else on the network. are viewed as ‘‘less compelling of protection than bodily
security or proprietary interests’’. 132 Despite all of theseThis would result in a more expansive conception
concerns, however, Canadian and U.S. courts permit theof duty than traditional tort law might otherwise have
recovery of negligently inflicted pure economic loss inimposed, but I do not feel it is an unreasonable or revo-
certain circumstances. 133lutionary step. The principle being invoked in the cyber-
space context, namely that of taking care not to create One useful analogy to the present problem is pro-
situations of risk that might foreseeably be exploited by vided by the American case, Union Oil Co. v. Oppen.134
criminals to attack others, is the same as that applied in In that case, fishermen successfully sought compensation
the physical world in the case of keys left in a vehicle. 125 for lost commercial fishing profits from oil companies
The number of parties to which one owes a duty of care that caused a major oil spill. Feldthusen suggests that this
is greater in the cyberspace context by virtue of the high was the correct result given that the oil companies were
level of interconnection between people made possible best situated to avoid the harm, and because there is no
by the Internet. The increased degree of interdepen- private party available to sue for property damage in the
dence (particularly with respect to security) among those case of a public resource. There was, accordingly, a strong
participating in cyberspace is also a feature of this envi- deterrence argument for permitting the plaintiffs to
ronment, such that it is arguably ‘‘just and fair’’ to require recover for economic losses resulting from damage to a
participants to look out for each other. Leaving keys in a public resource. 135 This reasoning is applicable in the
vehicle in one city is unlikely to injure anyone on the context of DDoS attacks. The Internet has arguably
other side of the globe, but maintaining an insecure attained the status of a public resource, which is endan-
network could easily injure many people. An overly lim- gered because the parties best-positioned to address
ited vision of proximity and thus of duty of care would cyber insecurity (including ISPs and vendors of software)
fail to recognize this fact. do not face the full costs of insecurity and accordingly do
not invest the optimal level of effort in remedying theAssuming the proximity hurdle can be passed, it is
problem.reasonably simple to pass the foreseeability hurdle. As
trade groups such as the consortium of British online Another counter-argument that the defendant ISP
gambling companies mentioned earlier begin to lobby might raise is that the victim of the DDoS attack was
ISPs to apply better security to combat DDoS attacks, 126 contributorily negligent in failing to take self-defensive
the harm to e-commerce enterprises resulting from steps. Plaintiffs who fail to use safety devices, particularly
botnet-driven DDoS activity is becoming impossible to car seatbelts, are often considered to have been contribu-
ignore. torily negligent. 136 ‘‘The essence of the argument is that
the plaintiff’s failure to employ the device was unreason-The losses suffered by the DDoS victim are most
able, and that this unreasonable conduct was a contrib-likely to be ‘‘pure economic losses’’ (i.e., economic losses
uting cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.’’ 137 In another Cana-that arise independent of any physical injury to person
dian case, the plaintiff poultry farmer’s failure to plug inor to property) flowing from the interruption in the use
a power failure alarm system on the night that the defen-of the victim’s computer services. The victim might
dant negligently cut the power lines was considered con-suffer loss of business, harm to goodwill and wasted
tributory negligence. The evidence was inconsistent onemployee time and effort. The victim is unlikely to have
how many other farmers employed these systems, butlost data, which would have made it possible to argue
25%–50% likely did. 138that data ought to be treated as property. 127 The DDoS
victim could sue the perpetrator of the attack for the It appears that the failure to take reasonable self-
economic losses using one of the intentional business protective measures might leave a plaintiff open to a
torts such as interference with contractual relations, or charge of contributory negligence. In the case of DDoS,
interference with economic relations by unlawful the self-defensive options are limited. Anti-DDoS services
means. 128 However, because the defendant ISP is being are reported to cost $12,000 per month when supplied
pursued using a negligence theory rather than a vicarious by large US ISPs. 139 It is uncertain whether these services
liability theory, the plaintiff faces the problem that the can handle all forms of DDoS and it is difficult to deter-
recovery of pure economic loss through a negligence mine the accuracy of the claims made by such service
lawsuit has been restricted by common law courts. providers. 140 These services seem sufficiently immature,
expensive and inconsistently deployed that it would beCommon law courts have been reluctant to permit
unlikely that the failure to use them would be construedthe recovery of pure economic loss due to the risk of
as contributory negligence. Nevertheless, the possibilityindeterminate liability, 129 the fear that lawsuits will pro-
remains that parties who are at considerable risk ofliferate and absorb too many scarce judicial resources, 130
DDoS and stand to lose large sums might be expected tothe need to respect and protect contractual allocations of
take such steps.loss, and the desire to preserve the vigorous free market
competition that might be discouraged by the prospect Should a duty of care be found to be owed by a
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would have to determine the requisite standard of care. ISPs, and end-users do not face the full consequences of
In other words, what actions would the law consider their contributions to cyber insecurity. Accordingly, they
reasonably required of ISPs to prevent harms emanating do not invest time and money to the socially optimal
from botnets on their networks? As noted earlier in this level of improved security.
paper, there appear to be a variety of measures that ISPs
In previous work, I have suggested that softwarecould take that would help to impede the propagation of
vendors should face liability in negligence for unreason-bot software (and thus suppress botnet creation), or to
ably insecure software. This would help to reducethrottle botnet activity on their networks. Many of the
malware that is spread by exploiting software vulnerabil-measures designed to prevent the creation of botnets
ities. However, malware is also spread due to the carelessand the spread of bot software have negative conse-
behaviour of end-users in opening infected files. It isquences for subscriber privacy and freedom. It might be
likely to be inefficient to pursue individual end-users topreferable to encourage ISPs to focus on effective source-
induce them to maintain the security of their systems.based preventive tools. Using these techniques, ISPs can
Instead, ISPs and other network operators are well-posi-monitor traffic emanating from their own networks and
tioned to enforce security in subscribers’ computers. Athrottle attacks launched against third parties. Experts
range of security measures that vary in their degree ofstudying the problem of DDoS note the desirability of
intrusiveness are open to ISPs. Some of these measuressuch approaches and suggest that incentives for ISPs to
may be so harmful to individual liberty and privacy thatdeploy them are currently insufficient. 141 Potential lia-
they are not worth the security improvement to bebility may encourage ISPs to develop and apply such
gained. Nevertheless, it is likely that some measures, suchtools effectively.
as enforced software patching and anti-virus software
maintenance, as well as source-based DDoS attack pre-
vention should be taken.Conclusion 
yber insecurity continues to create significant and Should ISPs not take reasonable steps to preventC increasing concern, particularly with respect to the DDoS attacks launched by botnets harboured on their
national security implications. Although vast quantities networks, they ought to be liable in negligence to the
of resources are employed to address the cyber security DDoS attack victims. While groups of DDoS attack vic-
problem, the steps taken so far are proving inefficient tims are so far restricting themselves to lobbying ISPs to
and insufficient. The parties best placed to take steps to take security measures, they may soon find it worthwhile
address cyber insecurity, including software vendors, to sue.
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